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Abstract
Taking ones’ own life is a moral and political transgression: it is taboo.  As suicide is a special  death that has  warranted a panoply of sanctions, inscriptions and taboos across many cultures (Retterstol, 1993),  suicide has come to play a crucial part in the formulation of  social order in many political philosophies, including liberalism.  The task of this article is to outline ways in which this making of political order can unfold in a liberal political context. Taking New Zealand as a particularly powerful case study, the discussion cuts a genealogical track through cultural practices of suicide regulation to make the case for a different way  of  understanding  the political place of suicide in liberalism. Conventionally given the role of litmus test for liberal freedom, cultural practices of suicide regulation in New Zealand are shown to inscribe and enact particular ways of being free. Relays between colonial, social and advanced liberal  modes of calculation  and  the criminally suicidal,  the  suicidally mad and those at risk  of suicide are all shown to  install a mode of power worked through links, networks and alliances that ‘govern persons in accordance with freedom’  (Rose, 1999:12).  This genealogy sets out to dis-quieten the assumption that suicide is a litmus test for liberal freedom. It is better to think of New Zealand’s attempts to regulate suicide as in the service of governing through freedom. 
Introduction
Suicide … by setting an example … would preserve to every one his chance for happiness in life, and would effectually free him from all danger of misery.  (Hume, 1783)

But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license. … Everyone…is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully. (Locke, 1681:ch II.6)
Suicide is, above anything else, a cultural phenomenon. Suicide is a special  death that has warranted a panoply of sanctions, inscriptions and taboos across many cultures (Retterstol, 1993). Taking ones’ own life is a moral and political transgression: it is taboo. As a taboo  is a  coding practice which ‘shores up wavering certainty’  as a means to effect socio-political order (Douglas, 2002 [1966]:xi), and as  political order is the systematic preservation of life over death (Seery, 1996),  this means that suicide is a transgression through which socio-political order is made. As such, suicide has come to play a crucial part in the formulation and elaboration of many political philosophies including liberalism.   
	Suicide is dear to liberalism, arguably the most influential and culturally powerful political doctrine in the West. The founding fathers of liberalism saw that suicide, or rather the liberal response to suicide, had a powerful place in the development of their thought.   As liberal thought frames political order through freedom, so suicide - as the quintessential voluntary death - is its most important challenge. When discussing suicide in politically liberal terms, the convention is to regard suicide in the abstract and as a vehicle for defining and defending particular freedoms. As demonstrated in the quotes from Hume and Locke above, this is because taking ones’ own life articulates the contradiction of freedom at the heart of liberal governance.  On the one hand we have the untrammelled libertarian freedom to suicide and on the other, we have the more conservative and circumspect freedom from suicide. This distinction between freedom to and freedom from is a cornerstone of liberal debate, and much social and moral turmoil. 
	Despite its profound influence and longevity in the annals of political analysis, this way of conceptualising political order through freedom has been contested and alternatives have been proffered. Embodied in Foucault’s work on governmentality and taken up more rigorously by Nicholas Rose,  one  particular  alternative paradigm approaches  liberal freedom as a practice rather than as a principle of  liberal rule (Foucault, 1991 [1982], Rose, 1999). Posing freedom as a practice rather than a principle of liberalism changes the political landscape of suicide.  Rather than being a vehicle for defining and defending particular freedoms, the regulation of suicide unfolds as a practice of freedom. 
	I have chosen to focus on New Zealand’s cultural practices of suicide regulation to   examine how they unfold as practices of freedom. As with any liberal democracy, New Zealand’s relationship with suicide is defined through freedom. Yet there are features specific to New Zealand that make it an attractive case study.  New Zealand is a particularly useful site of investigation because it has undergone stark and far reaching social transformations in   a relatively short time.  Its existence as a former colony of Britain through the mid to late nineteen hundreds that became the social laboratory of the world during the  mid twentieth century  and experienced a  radical  turn to neo-liberalism through the late twentieth  century (Tennant, 2004:12), marks it as a place that has embodied  intense  yet varied experiences of  liberalism. New Zealand experienced colonial dependence upon an imperial power itself struggling with the emergence of liberal democracy, to become  the doyen of Keynesian social democracy  then  surprising to some, the  vanguard of  late  20th century neo-liberalism.  Its liberal past and present is worthy of note and inspection by those unfamiliar with New Zealand yet who have an interest in the social history of liberalism.   
	As an examination of the social history of liberalism, instead of following the convention of regarding suicide in the abstract and as a means to define and defend particular freedoms, I set out to demonstrate that in New Zealand at least, suicide is better thought of in the concrete as a practice of freedom. I use the phrase practice of freedom to mean localised cultural practices that, in their attempts to regulate suicide, inscribe in very specific ways what it means to be free. This use rests upon a very specific understanding of how liberal rule works. As I go on to elaborate in the body of this paper, in the everyday, projects of formal rule become aligned with the strategies and calculations of independent authorities, and relays are forged between these calculations of authorities and the aspirations of free citizens. It is in this way that cultural practices of suicide regulation ‘govern persons in accordance with freedom’ (Rose, 1999:68). 
	Commonly, the way that suicide is dealt with in a given society is a means of judging how liberal it is. If a society hangs draws and quarters the body of a suicide, refuses to bury it in sacred ground and refuses all inheritance rights, the society is seen as particularly barbaric, particularly un-concerned with human rights, particularly illiberal.  When seen to treat those who would suicide 1  with compassion and the best of medical knowledge, that society is seen to respect people’s rights, to be more liberal  (Hillman, [1965] 1997:6,7). When set side by side like this, it seems as if there is a reverse relationship between liberalism and the institutional regulation of suicide. The more liberal the system, the more free an individual is to decide their own future and the less suicide is formally regulated. 
	The point of using Rose’s formulation of governance through freedom is to de-naturalise such taken for granted assumptions about suicide regulation in liberal societies. Rose’s perspective de-stabilises this naturalised view of social order and suicide regulation because it brings into view a different account of the relationship between suicide regulation and social order, one where liberal social order is achieved in part through the regulation of suicide. This is because Rose’s notion of governance through freedom brings into view how particular practices of suicide regulation generate orderly and docile New Zealand subjects. In New Zealand at least, practices of suicide regulation to some extent make up liberal governance. I set out to demonstrate this point by examining New Zealand’s historical practices aimed at regulating suicide.
	Before moving to the substantive, I want to briefly outline how I understand Rose’s notion of governing through freedom. Governing through freedom nests within a productive understanding of power associated with Foucault’s work, where analyses of power are concerned with detailing the complex and contingent histories of how various authorities have sought to govern conduct through shaping who we are as people (Foucault, 1977).  Foucault’s account of government draws on understandings of sovereignty (as the discontinuous exercise of power through display and spectacle) discipline (as the continuous exercise of power through surveillance, individualisation and normalisation) and bio-power (as a politics concerned with individuals as members of populations) that are seen to emerge within and explicitly tied to liberal societies of the nineteenth century (Foucault, 1977). For him liberal government is achieved through freedom rather than the conventional view that government and freedom are like water and oil, where liberalism works by restricting government and extending freedoms.
	Governance through freedom is about lining up and forging connections between the calculations of disparate authorities and personal aspirations to freedom and effective government is achieved when individuals’ aspirations align with authorities’ calculations and political aims.  For Rose, this gets worked out through discourses of civility, where the contingent aims and techniques devised by various authorities to solve particular problems forge partial and contingent alliances with what it means to be a civilised person, to be a free citizen. It is these alliances that come to inform and give meaning to people’s sense of themselves as free citizens and shape their conduct. 
	The alignment of authoritative and subjective practices and strategies is always partial and contingent. Mechanisms of regulation focus on those who fall within and outside of these webs of civilization, and the construction of marginal behaviours itself becomes a technology for connecting formal aims and personal aspirations. Those who do not conform to the conventional interpretation of civilised behaviour are sanctioned, and by being sanctioned, confirm the freedom of those who comply with authorities’ aims. For example, cleanliness is associated with civility, but the technologies that authorities use actually circumscribe what it means to be clean, what it means to be civilised, what one is required to do to be allowed associated benefits. When authority’s formulation of clean is framed through practical technologies that require inside flushing toilets and sewage disposal networks, it is difficult to be regarded as clean and therefore civilised and therefore allowed the benefits associated with being civilised if one refuses to make use of this technology and prefers instead to make ones’ ablutions in the field or gutter.  In other words, people’s ways of being free aligns with the authorities’ ways of being free through a form of moral regulation. Liberal institutional presuppositions mean that modern individuals are ‘obliged to be free’ (Rose, 1999:87 italics in original). 
	Effective government is not a matter of direct intervention in the lives of its citizens. Rather, it is a matter of establishing conditions that foster particular kinds of freedom and closes off other kinds of freedom. Using Marx’s account of the emergence of wage labour, Rose explains that conditions were established that freed people from the land through the removal of rights to that land and the ability to a limited self-subsistence. When combined with laws that forbade collective action, this freedom from the land emerged as the freedom for exploitation in the wage labour market.  No longer tied to the land and forbidden from  non-wage earning forms of  succor, the individualised wage worker  came to the market ‘of their own free will’ (Rose, 1999:70). 
	As governance through freedom is inextricably bound to the activities and calculations of a proliferation of authorities, so political forces make use of forms of authority beyond the state. Rose is at pains to point out that  experts’ aims and strategies  are not  merely  ‘realised’ in specific locales but rather worked  through ‘translation processes of various sorts’  between the  situated aims and objectives of a multitude of authorities and experts and aspirations of  free citizens (Rose, 1999:48-49). Linkages between different authorities are assembled through these situated translations.  
	This approach totally reframes the way of imagining relationships between, for instance, the legal aspects of the state and state functionaries - from a view where   functionaries merely realise the law as an extension of the state to a more complex notion of the contingent lashing up of relays between different experts and authorities and aspirations   of people who have come to regard themselves as free citizens. Having said that, their understanding of government at a distance as a specific  approach to achieving government that has particular resonance in liberal societies does not  supersede or deny the presence of direct government. Dean, Hindess and Kendall have variously examined different ways in which authoritarianism and government at a distance intertwine (Kendall, 1997, Hindess, 2001, Dean, 2002).  
	As I am interested in how suicide regulation aligns with liberal governance in New Zealand, I concentrate on government at a distance. By this I mean practices that configure constitutional distance through  the ‘decisions  and  endeavors  of  non-political  modes of authority’ and spatial distance through  ‘technologies of government  (that) link a multitude of  experts in distant sites to the  calculations of those at the centre’ (Rose, 1999:50). When historical practices of regulating suicide in New Zealand are examined, it is clear that suicide is a means through which free subjects are constituted in the sense outlined above. 
Method
Using the Foucauldian genealogical method ([1976] 1990), we can examine how suicide regulation in New Zealand constitutes governance through freedom by a series of distinct articulations between the authoritative practices of ecclesiastics, the judiciary, medical doctors and officials of the executive.  The ecclesiastical  is identified with  religious practices, specifically  those of the Christian Church and achieves regulation  with constructions of the soul and its salvation through penance (Foucault, [1976] 1990:63). The judiciary is  concerned with  justice and the rule of law, and hence with the punishment  of those who transgress (Foucault, 1977:24). Death centers medicine in the sense that the focal point for medicine is to prevent death. This aim informs its characteristic practices of  treatment and cure (Foucault, [1963] 1994:126). The executive is that collection of practices which focus on mastering fate, the begetter of future misfortune, through prudential and economic management to secure against  misadventure (Foucault, 1991 [1982], Rose, 1999). 
Articulations within and across these sets of authoritative practices are uneven and   ad hoc,  yet each draws its authority and  justifies its practices through distinctive codes of conduct  that  seek to generate  boundaries between  those  who abide and those who do not abide by the codes. In all four, suicide is interpolated as a transgression in distinct ways: ecclesiastical practices operate through a discourse of canonical law received from God that defines transgressors as sinners and suicide as a moral sin.  Judicial practices operate through legal justice and the transgression of suicide is a crime rather than a sin. For medicine, codes of practice operate through science and suicide is understood as a pathology.  Last but not least, the executive operates in terms of security against risk or misfortune, which defines suicide as an over-accumulation of misfortunes. These four regulative regimes are present throughout, but as their relative positions drastically re-organise, different modes of suicide regulation constitute different suicide subjects.  It is these distinct modes and subjects that I set out to detail below.
Changing relationships between these four regulatory regimes divide the New Zealand historical record into distinct eras dominated by a particular way of understanding suicide as a transgression which, following terminology used in the sociology of   deviance and health, I have labeled criminalisation, pathologisation and riskification. 2 
	My account was developed through a process of gathering and sorting an array of historical materials pertaining to the formal regulation of suicide in New Zealand. As my synthesis of historical material focused on the formal pronouncements of various authorities, it is an archaeological genealogy that interrogates and pieces together the truth making regulative scripts (Foucault, 1972). 
	Within the terms of its limitations, these investigations highlighted a number of significant events in which judicial, ecclesiastic, medical and executive concerns were complexly intertwined.  The following genealogies are based on the detailed analysis of a host of archival documents accessed from the extensive range of original material held in the Pacific Collection of Massey University Library. These documents include lineages of legal statutes and their associated parliamentary debates, court case proceedings, Parliamentary Bills, House of Representatives Annual Reports, Official Statistical Publications, Ministerial Consultation and draft strategy documents. I also searched various newspapers, magazine periodicals and academic articles. I have drawn upon a range of professional practice manuals, historical theses and institutionally produced histories. To clarify and corroborate points that were not fully documented, I conducted telephone interviews with key spokespeople in government ministries, professional and voluntary organisations and representatives of the Catholic Church.
	The archaeological flavour of the account raises questions about its genealogical status because genealogies are intended to unsettle established truths about a phenomenon by focusing on the disruptive, the silences, and the gaps in its truth.  It could be argued that my attention to formal accounts of suicide regulation, and so my inattention to those who lie beyond regulatory discourses, is in danger of describing the smooth truth of suicide and defiling genealogical aims.  In defense, by developing this material archaeologically, the practical and conceptual limitations of the material I gathered lend credence to one aim of genealogical analysis which is to generate histories of omission.  Traces of disruption silence and gaps tend to exist beyond the written record. So,  when delving into eras before living memory and  when access is problematic (although there is material held by the Coroner’s Office, I was not granted permission to research its archives (Leahy, 1997)), the history that is told is a history of the formal record. This archaeological moment is necessary to the genealogical project,   because it is in reference to the archaeology that the omissions and gaps can be discerned.  Also, this article is part of a larger project that does attend explicitly to those who currently exceed regulatory discourses  (McManus, 2003).  Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that suicide in Western culture suffers from a lack of critical engagement. It is cloaked with a very intense moral imperative that demands, within academia, that researchers find the cause so that suicide can be stopped. To talk about the different ways in which suicide is constructed through regulative activities is a significant break with convention and marks a point of embarkation on the genealogical road.
Colonial freedoms: The criminalisation of suicide, 1840-1893
The ways in which suicide was regulated in the early years of New Zealand’s existence as a British colony is telling in relation to how expert aims of curbing suicide align with New Zealand citizens’ aspirations as free subjects.   The colonial period (1840-1893) was dominated by a judicially configured assemblage that characterised taking one’s own life as a criminal transgression. The  specific  assemblages of the four mechanisms of self-formulation came together  in such a way as  to render the  criminalisation of  taking one’s own life as an instantiation of government at a distance, as it put forward a particular way for people to regard themselves as New Zealand citizens, as free subjects.  
	Some time in the afternoon of the sixth of February 1840, the Treaty of Waitangi was signed. From that moment, suicide in New Zealand was governed through the British rule of judicial law (Spiller, 1995:55).  When the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi was replaced by the Supreme Court Ordinance of 1842, this  made New Zealand a Crown Colony and deployed the British system of common, equity and statute law in New Zealand (O'Keefe and Farrand, 1980). The official colonization of New Zealand rendered death by one’s own hand a criminal offence under common law.  Even while New Zealand showed a greater reliance on executive practices to effect judicial governance than Britain, 3 as in Britain, suicide was governed through criminalization. This mode of governance focused regulatory efforts in particular upon completed suicides, on punishments directed at their body and their property.
	At the time the Treaty of Waitangi was signed, British suicide regulation practices were built around the judicial domination of and incursion into ecclesiastical, medical and executive regimes. Legal discourse defined suicide as criminal and shaped the consequences of a suicidal act in terms of punishment. More accurately, a felony punishable by ignominious burial and forfeiture built on the common-law charge of felony of a man’s self or to use the legal term, felo-de-se. 
A Felo-de-se is he that deliberately puts an end to his own existence; or commits any unlawful, malicious act, the consequences of which is his own death, as if attempting to kill another he runs upon his antagonist’s sword; or shooting at another the gun bursts and kills himself. (Clift v. Schwabe, 1846, Common Bench Pleas. Italics in original) 
	The law depended upon the office of the coroner to implement the punishments for felo-de-​se. However, because the coroner's office had emerged from the expansion of the state into ecclesiastical domains many centuries before under the reign of Henry VIII, coroners combined judicial and church punishments (Curzon, 1979:29). For the church, suicide was a Mortal Sin that represented a fundamental rejection of God's divine authority (McBrien, 1995:1192). The ecclesiastics not only set the parameters of the judicial problem, they also provided the terms of punishment. According to the Catholic Encyclopaedia, self-murder belongs among a group of conducts regarded as mortal sins and categorised as ‘death-dealing’(McBrien, 1995:1192-3). Unlike merely venial transgressions, mortal sins are commissioned ‘with full knowledge and full consent of the free will’ (McBrien, 1995:1192-3). Mortal sins thus represent a deliberate rejection of God’s divine authority. Fundamentally, suicide was a willful rejection of the absolute authority of the law against murder.  If willful suicide utterly rejected absolute authority, then that authority must respond in kind. This rejection of the completed suicide was played out as practices aimed at denying the possibility of eternal life in the hereafter. In ecclesiastical terms, the worst punishment that could be visited on Christian sinners was spiritual denial or excommunication, detailed at the Synod of Arles AD 452, Braga AD 536 and Antisidor AD 590 (Retterstol, 1993:19). In practical terms, excommunication translated into legalised corpse mutilation, a refusal of permission for self-murderers to be buried within church grounds and other acts of bodily defilement – in short, church punishments included excommunication, public mutilation of corpses and ignominious burial. These punishments were humiliating. Take for instance the Coroner’s instructions for the burial of one Amy Stokes in the British Parish of St. Botolph's in 1590:
... by the sayed crowner that she should be carried from her sayed howse to some cross way neare the townes end and theare that [she] should ha[ve a] stake dreven thorowgh her brest and so be buried with the stake to be seene for a memoryall that others goinge by seeinge the same myght take heed for committinge the lyke faite. (Aldergate Chronicles 165-9 quoted in  Forbes, 1979:136)
During the nineteenth century, after the public execution of the suicide, Coroners often bequeathed the corpses to medical schools for public dissection, or to art suppliers who would pose and plaster-cast the already mutilated bodies for life-drawing classes  (Llewellyn, 1991:149, Williams, 1975:40).
	Although the judiciary took precedence, medical and executive regimes with their own forms of regulation intersected with the judiciary to produce long chains of power that connected this colony to its centre in Britain by aligning political aims with localized experts’ ambitions and colonial peoples’ sense of identity as free citizens.  The medical regime defined illness in Galenic terms as a humoral imbalance. Suicide was explained as the result of melancholia, lunatic episodes brought on by  an overabundance of black bile (Foucault, [1965]1988:129).  As medicine was concerned with treating the living, so medicine’s concern with suicide focused on those who had attempted to take their lives.  Attemptors were automatically regarded as lunatics suffering from melancholia and as lunatics, were subject to medical practices focused on restraint that typically meant being chained in dark, cold, solitary environments with little or no human contact (Busfield, 1986:169). Although the likes of Pinel, Tuke and Connolly had championed treatment rather than restraint since the late seventeenth century in Europe and Britain, the New Zealand record is dominated by a double restraint (Jermyn, 1951). As there were no asylums in New Zealand until the 1860s, most often lunatics lived out their incarceration in gaol alongside common criminals (Jermyn, 1951). Again because of the lack of facilities, if lunatics were seen as a threat to themselves or each other (which they would have been if committed on the grounds of  attempted suicide)  they would be physically restrained within gaol (Bloomfield, 2001). It was not until the 1860s that asylums were built in New Zealand and treatments based on work, fresh air, quietness and moral guidance were put into  place (Brookes and Thomson, 2001). Even then, the shift from restraint to treatment was patchy and incomplete. As Jermyn notes (1951), these ground-breaking  methods were  often disregarded  in the  daily duties of  attendants.  
	The regime of security was projected through private life assurance companies. Suicide was regarded as a category of risk that could not be insured against, alongside death through dueling, death on the high seas, death through war, or death ‘at the hands of justice’ (Common Bench 437, 1846). Life assurance policies regarded suicide as an unacceptable risk. As an act too easily commissioned for the gain of benefactors and thus unfair terms of insurance, punishment took the form of denying security and voiding policies. The object of regulation was the person who would risk their life to profit their heirs. 
	So, on the cusp of colonial expansion into the Antipodes, suicide was regulated by being criminalised and punished by the judiciary. When this mode of regulation was transposed to New Zealand the laws and punishments attached to suicide remained intact: it was a crime under Colonial common law, Coroners’ courts were obliged to conduct an inquest into any suspicious death including suicide, Coroners had the power to impose forfeiture and ignominious burial upon the deceased if a verdict of suicide was reached. The Church in Colonial New Zealand regarded suicide as a mortal sin that brought automatic excommunication. The medical profession, in the main, viewed suicide as the result of lunacy best contained by physical restraint. Life assurance companies continued to void life assurance policies if a suicide was suspected. Nevertheless, New Zealand presented particular challenges to the Colonial administration and it was this uniqueness that generated the colony’s specific intonation to the judicial regulation of suicide and also to how colonial rule governed at a distance. 
	There were two telling departure points between Britain and New Zealand in relation to suicide. The British medical assumption that all attempted and completed suicides were the result of lunacy was prevalent in New Zealand and the fear of lunatics so great that the community demanded their incarceration. However, due to the sparse and dispersed nature of colonial settlement in the early years, New Zealand was unable to provide community supported institutions for the insane, as was the case in Britain (Busfield, 1986:172). Since there were no separate facilities, the local constabulary incarcerated attempted suicides in gaols alongside felons and paupers. This caused public outcries and so attempted suicides were kept separate from the criminal population and housed in the small asylums built and run by the Colonial administration (Tennant, 1989:12). New Zealand’s resolution of the lunatic problem resulted in the colony being one of the first countries to provide asylums funded and run by a central administration in the Western world. This unique circumstance marks a technologisation of judicial rule in the colony in that the judicial authority was able to connect itself up with the bureaucratic technology of administration and in doing so implement its aims of colonial rule into everyday existence. Judicial rule was also rendered technical by shaping the everyday actions of Coroners as they fulfilled their legal duties.  As Coroners were appointed to the colony, they were  equipped  with  a  little  booklet with a long  formal  name  - The New Zealand Justice of the Peace, resident  Magistrate, coroner  and  constable guidelines  by A.J. Johnston (1864) –abbreviated  on its title page to Johnston’s Formulary. Johnston’s Formulary detailed the wording to be used for judgments, directives, orders and missives that Coroners and Magistrates may be required to write. This booklet effected judicial government by providing the list of procedures and templates that defined the administrative procedures which Coroners were to follow.
 	Suicide laws regulated others. As suspected suicides were legally subject to Coronial investigation and if found guilty, subject  to forfeiture and ignominious burial, so family members faced, at best, the ordeal of the public inquest  and the very real likelihood  of losing the deceased’s estate. These codes of civility extended not only to family members but also to the wider colony and its centre, Britain.  Take for instance the procedures for documenting   suicide – the intricate regulations laid out in the Coroner’s code mesh judicial and executive concerns in ways that give shape to civil society.  To be a free citizen in New Zealand, one must be rational (i.e. not lunatic) and loyal to the British crown.  This is indirect governance in the sense that different kinds of expertise and authority – legal and political– get lashed up, connected together, forge alliances through ad hoc and practical attempts to think about and act upon specific problems like suicide in ways that come to infuse a whole variety of practices regulating everyday life.  
The way suicide was regulated at this time gave a particular colonial shape to government at a distance and can be seen in the way that the   statistics   derived from these administrative procedures played through governance at the centre. Suicide statistics were   sent to Britain in such a format as to stress the effectiveness of colonial government conducted at the furthest physical reaches of the empire. Only suicide statistics for European men were published, and they went into great detail on the various procedures, charges and punishments meted out (New Zealand Government, 1858: III). These statistics were sent home in  official ordinances and also in magazines that targeted both entrepreneurial investors and   those   referred to as  Wakefield’s ‘uneasy classes’  (Ernst, 1991:66). Suicide was portrayed as a very rare event that would not be tolerated and that the settler population, would be subject to at minimum, a full judicial enquiry and punishment.  As suggested by Ernst, though given a different inflection here, this ‘fulfilled an important ideological function in maintaining the colonial order’ (1991:67).  Or as Kendall puts it in his discussion of the colonial administration of Australia, it can be thought of as one of ‘many innovative governmental strategies to deal with the problems of distance’ (Kendall, 1997:224). So the intricacies of suicide regulation constitute that which they appear to represent - colonial government at a distance. 
This way of regulating suicide relied upon and so constituted a particular kind of free subject. Criminalising suicide depended upon and so posited a subject defined in terms of free will. Yet  the practical elaboration of strategies to ensure effective rule in the colony  defined and  delimited this free will as the  capacity to  act rationally  which meant  the  responsibility to control  one’s will  and  not give way to  willful, murderous  intention. Coroners, medics, the clergy and administrative officers came to act in particular ways that vested respect for rationality, orderliness, independence and fortitude. People came to revere these and frown upon those who displayed irrationality, melancholia and dependence in the face of hardship and isolation in the colony (Phillips, 1987). And so New Zealand citizens were constituted as free subjects in the knowledge that their freedom depended upon their respect for a distant authority displayed through their personal orderliness, independence and fortitude. 
Social freedoms:  The pathologisation of suicide, 1893-1974
In 1893 colonial administration gave way to home rule.  In the decades that followed, there was a shift in the balance of power across the authorities concerned with regulating suicide.  As judicial practices dominated the alliance of authorities that regulated suicide in the colonial era, so medical practices came to dominate the same alliance of authorities in the successive era. This is traced in a shift from punishment of completed suicides to the enforced sequestration and medical treatment of attempted suicide in asylums in line with attempts at treatment being introduced to asylums. This shift in suicide regulation constituted a recalibration of governance at a distance. Colonial government at a distance was configured through getting colonists to govern themselves as they would be governed at home. Under independence, governance at a distance is inculcated not through colonial centre and outpost relations but through micro practices that posit the social as the problem through which populations would be governed and subjectivities would be enabled in the name of freedom. There was a new reciprocity between state and citizen enacted in the service of individual development and social progress.
	Home rule meant that British common laws used in New Zealand were codified into fully New Zealand laws. Felo-de-se was abrogated in this translation from British common law to New Zealand Statute law and thus suicide was no longer a crime in New Zealand. This made New Zealand one of the first Western countries to de-criminalise suicide. In comparison, Britain did not  de-criminalise suicide until 1961 (Garrow, 1981:133). However, even though suicide was de-criminalised, aiding and abetting and attempted suicide remained on the statute books. Moreover, attempted suicides were, to use a turn of phrase, automatically sectioned into state care. The salient point here is the shift in the flow of authority between judicial and medical authorities. Before, medicalising practices acted to verify and legitimate judicial authority. In this era, this relationship is reversed. Judicial procedures came to support, legitimate and verify the medical gaze as most authoritative in relation to suicide regulation.
	As the balance between suicide regulation practices shifted from the judiciary to medicine, so governance at a distance reconfigured from distance deployed through the colonial relationship to the distance deployed through universal welfare provision. Distance deployed through universal welfare provision means that government operated as a particular relationship between state and civil society which was embodied in the idea of society as something separate from and beyond the formal sphere of politics. As Rose would say, government at a distance was deployed through ‘the state assuming responsibility for the management of a whole variety of risks – to individuals, to employers, to the state itself - in the name of society’ (1999:128). Security was sought through universal or population-wide measures that worked on the micro level of individual attention. For instance the  consolidation  of numerous projects under the banner  of the Social Security Act  (1938) marked the emergence of  the welfare state as a technology  through which the  state  came to assume   responsibility in the name of the  good of society.
The criminalisation of suicide was radically displaced in the decades either side of the turn to the 20th century. From 1893 to 1974, suicide was regulated primarily by discourses of pathologisation. Driven by the authority of the medical regime, suicide was transformed from a matter of legally accountable reason into an issue of mental health. Rather than a completed crime to be judged, suicide signalled an individual’s psychological dysfunction, a symptom of encroaching death, medicine’s ultimate foe. The pathologisation of suicide was deployed through an asylum system that treated attempted suicide as mental illness. Treatment entailed sequestration from everyday life to facilitate the application of physical treatments and practical moral instruction.
As I have already  suggested, from the early to mid  eighteen hundreds,  medical practitioners understood suicide in terms of lunacy caused by an imbalance of humors, an imbalance that at best could be restrained. Even though medicine’s concept of humors  had no place for the  concept of intention which was central to the judiciary, the judiciary relied on the medical regime to trigger Coronial investigations into completed felo-de-se and to restrain lunatic attempted suicides that fell beyond criminal prosecution. However, from the 1890s the medical model for understanding illness metamorphosised from this Galenic equilibrium of humors  based model  to an empirically-based  model of clinical diagnosis (Foucault, [1963] 1994especially  chapters  8-10). Clinical diagnosis aimed to deduce pathologies from observed signs and symptoms. It relied on the practice of taking detailed patient case notes based on long term observation. Clinical treatments developed out these observational notes. Records about changes in the patient’s condition were used to deduce the results of medical intervention. The general model of pathology was part of a shift in medical discourse from madness to mental illness that marked a scientisation of medicine’s basis of authority (Foucault 1963:124-148).
Even though the clinical practices of mental illness emerged through the latter half of the nineteenth century, suicide was not formally incorporated into the new diagnostic categories until the early decades of the twentieth century when suicide was consistently linked to the depressive illness that was regarded as a form of affective disorder.  Suicide, or rather the mental illness that ‘presented’ as attempted suicide, was treated as the symptom or effect of deeper psychological disturbance (Lester, 1988:3). In this new clinical discourse,  as human illness was viewed as a disorder of specific systems and functions,  affective disorders like depressive illnesses that  presented as suicide attempts  became  amenable to treatment and cure.
The most common forms of medical intervention for depressive illness within psychiatry were physical treatments and practical moral management. Physical treatments focused on bodily applications, while moral management focused on controlling the physical and social environment, in particular of the asylum in-patient. New Zealand’s psychological medicine favoured a disease model of mental illness and physical treatments for suicidal patients  (Styles, 1997:118). In the 1920s, physical treatments included hot baths, massages, and purgatives. Physical and convulsive therapies like insulin and electric shock treatments were developed in Europe in the early 1930s and hailed as great successes. Particular treatments became associated with specific illnesses and were quickly taken up around the world. During this era, ‘electroconvulsive therapy [was] used in depressions with suicidal risks more than in any other condition’ (Stengel and Cook, 1958). Although force was sometimes necessary to carry out the medical intervention, the intention of this intervention was to treat rather than restrain. 
As said, clinical diagnosis and treatment relied upon taking detailed case notes and ascertaining which interventions improved the condition. This form of medical intervention was seen to work best in isolated conditions, where those being treated were free from distractions and influences that might jeopardise the effectiveness of treatment. Clinical treatment of mental illness was seen as most effective if conducted in a controlled and secluded environment - the asylum. The explicit environmental control embodied by the asylum was also understood as a matter of ‘practical moral management’ (Brunton, 1986). Asylum staff were the patients’ only source of human contact, and so were regarded as an effective source of moral guidance. As staff deported themselves impeccably, so patients would learn through the example set by their protectors. This practical moral management supported and extended asylums’ physical regime of treatments. The intent was to treat through sequestration and practical moral management. This discourse ‘instilled a faith that insanity could be cured’ (Brunton, 1996:8). In New Zealand, this medical discourse came to usurp the previously dominant place of the judiciary in the regulation of suicide.
This pathologisation reordered the network of regulatory relationships. Medical practices insinuated themselves into the other authoritative regimes. In the new order, neither judicial nor executive or ecclesiastical powers worked without recourse to the medical model of pathology and treatment.
The powers of medicine inflected executive insurance technologies. Drawing upon the medical discourses of mental illness, nationalised insurance schemes moved from a focus on life assurance to a concern with public health and social security. These moves included the micro development of compensation legislation, notably the Deaths by Accidents Compensation Act (1952). This Act allowed compensation claims for the dependants of suicide on the condition that the suicide had followed some kind of physical injury inflicted at an earlier date. Coote (1976) outlines two precedents for the Act’s ruling. The positive precedent was the NZ Court of Appeal case, Murdoch v British Israel Foundation [1942] NZLR, 600),  in which the deceased,

a tramway worker had been crushed between a motorcar and a tram and had suffered amputation of one leg and serious injury to the other. He became depressed and eventually killed himself. (Coote 1976:54) 
The logic of this precedent presumed that an act of suicide was due to mental illness and that only a connection between a previous injury and the onset of mental illness had to be proven. A negative precedent for the Act was based on a liability appeal, in which the deceased was given the opportunity to take his or her own life through the negligence of a caretaker. Such claims were excluded from compensation. In the test case of the liability of a custodian, (Palliser v Waikato Hospital Board [1974] NZLR 561, 569-575),  compensation was not allowed as to do so would allow ‘accreditation of a benefit to the estate or representative of a man who has committed suicide whilst responsible in law for his actions’ (Coote 1976:58). 
Suicide compensation was thus available only if there was a case for mental illness induced by physical injury. Once again, medicine had infiltrated the executive methods of achieving security. The executive’s concept of security through health and compensation was based upon a pathologisation of attempted suicide. The transgression of suicide was problematised as a pathology best sorted through the medical treatment of individual pathology in the name of the wellbeing of society.
Medicine discretely inflected the ecclesiastical regime. In New Zealand’s Catholic Seminaries of the 1950s, priests were encouraged to understand suicides as ‘people pushed over the brink’ by mental illness (McAloon, 2000). The priest’s role was to support parishioners in their grief and not to add to their burden by condemning the sins of their departed ones (McAloon, 2000).
Previously the canonical law expressly forbade burial to six classes of Catholics, one of which was suicide. However, the Second Vatican Council of 1956 detailed a change in burial restrictions that, although belated in secular terms, acknowledged the powerful influence of the medical discourse of suicide as mental illness.
Suicide: “Those who, in full possession of their faculties have killed themselves.” In modern practice, and according to most medical authorities, a person who commits suicide is considered deprived at least temporarily of the full possession of his faculties. Psychiatrists and medical examiners regularly issue a certificate, and it is considered sufficient proof by most ecclesiastical authorities. … The deceased is to be given Christian burial, but in a way that avoids scandal. (Second Vatican Council, 1967:781) 
The social regulation of suicide configures government at a distance both, literally, in the way that transgressors are sequestered in asylums, and metaphorically, in the way that these practices encourage a free subject defined and delimited in terms of normality.  
Let us examine the statistical representation of suicide at the time.  Medical statistics of attempted suicide painted a picture of the suicide subject as a middle aged woman or elderly man of European descent, suffering from depression caused by the unpredictable challenges of life (McGeorge, 1942:71). This statistical profile informed the policies of the nationalised mental health system that focused on the maintenance of the asylum system of mental health care. The asylum system involved separating the ill person from the healthy community and treating them in secluded hospitals until they were either diagnosed cured and released back into the community or diagnosed incurable and made permanent residents (Tennant 1989:35). It also informed a range of other policies built upon a particular conception of   what it was to be normal. Medicine provided and endorsed a particular model of the healthy and normal. In particular, the pathologisation of attempted suicide constructed the image of an emotionally strong Pakeha man (of European descent) as the normal, healthy subject.
Styles’ study of admission and diagnostic data from Sunnyside Hospital in the 1920s and 1930s highlights the models psychiatrists used to understand mental illness. As Styles shows, the categories used to define mental illness ‘endorsed a nationalistic construction of healthy “manhood” that was characterised by willpower and emotional invulnerability’ (Styles 1997:5). They also reveal a ‘construction of women’s mental illness associated with reproductive function’ (Styles 1997:122). The medical pathologisation of suicide endorsed the construction of a gendered subjectivity, a construction that recurred throughout 20th century New Zealand. According to Phillips, for example, the period from 1920 to 1950 was dominated by images of ‘the family man’, characterised by a ‘strong yet benevolent will’ that provided for his dependent wife and child (Phillips, 1987:238). The pathologisation of attempted suicides was one of the practices that contributed to the formation of this identity, the New Zealand citizen as free.
To summarise this phase: all four discourses re-focused attention upon the living transgressor. The attempted suicide became the pivotal focus of regulation that extended to family members and the wider community. By justifying the separation and confinement of attempted suicides on the grounds of mental illness, suicide was pathologised. Furthermore, the process of pathologisation defined what was considered as normal conduct, and this normal conduct was used as the benchmark to regulate people’s conduct in the wider community. Freedom is engendered by normality. In New Zealand, the governance of suicide through practices of pathologisation prevailed until the mid-1970s.
Freedom of choice: The riskification of suicide, 1975-2000
We now live in an age of suicide risk. In the medicalised mode of governance that preceded it, the executive regime framed suicide as a problem to be dealt with upon presentation. People had to attempt suicide before the practices attendant to pathologisation were visited upon them. The executive approached attempted suicide as an existing breach of security. It responded by providing asylum-based, medical treatment to repair that breach. Government at a distance got constituted through attempted suicides as acts of transgression. Since the 1970s, however, the executive approach transformed from repairing known breaches to anticipating potential breaches and heading them off at the pass.
	The executive came to view suicide as a category of risk. As Ewald explains,
the notion of risk goes together with those of chance, hazard, probability, eventuality or randomness on the one hand, and those of loss or damage on the other … that is formalised by the calculus of probabilities. (Ewald, 1991:199) 
As a category of risk, suicide is calculable and, on these terms, its probability and therefore potential cost can be determined (Coggan, 1995:83). This in turn allows for decisions to be made about how much is too much decisions that trigger the strategies for the prevention of risks that are seen as too great, as too costly. Assessing and responding to risk involves the statistical calculation of risk categories and the identification of at-risk populations, in order to determine appropriate prevention practices and where to target them. The anticipation and prevention of potential risks, called risk management, involves the community. As risks are omnipresent, they are in the community at all times (Levi, 2000:578). Accordingly, the community is the site where prevention practices will be located. As repositories of risk, community members are implicated in their prevention.
	The logic of the strategy was laid out in Adolescent Health: Potential For Action  (O'Regan, 1992), an early elaboration of the parameters used by the New Zealand national youth suicide prevention initiative  that culminated in  the  In Our Hands document (Ministry of Health, 1998). Adolescent Health understands suicide as the consequence of dangerous behaviour. Adolescents are seen as taking unnecessary risks that signal a lack of care about themselves. This lack of self-care is a sign of low self-esteem and so is indicative of poor mental health and an increased risk of suicide. On these terms, executive practices are to be geared toward helping people help themselves by changing their self-understanding from low to high self-esteem  (Dickinson et al., 2000). People involved in suicide prevention (epidemiologists, counsellors, policy analysts and so on) should guide youth toward ‘the recovery of well-being’ by helping them to adopt a ‘healthy lifestyle’ (O’Regan 1992:10). Such practices will motivate youth to care for themselves, take fewer risks and thus reduce the rate of youth suicide.
The executive focuses on generating self-care practices in the community, practices that foster individual self-care among those at risk. This self-care is institutionalised by dividing tasks between the executive and the community. The development and monitoring of services is undertaken by ministerial task forces. These task forces have laid out a series of performance targets and intervention strategies in terms of the following five goals: (1) promoting wellbeing in the community (through mental health education initiatives that will increase family, youth, whanau 4 and community resilience to life stressors); (2) early identification and help (through directing community institutions to develop protocols that will identify those individuals at risk and in need of referral); (3) crisis support and treatment (through setting up crisis support teams within existing mental health provision); (4) support after suicide (through grief counselling); and (5) gathering information and collating research (Ministry of Health 1998:13).
The actual implementation of services is undertaken through the contestable funding of community-based providers, including psychiatric treatment centres, community mental health programmes, school-based identification programmes, crisis phone lines, programmes targeting high-risk groups, media-based prevention programmes, and programmes for the family and friends of suicide victims (Barwick 1992:2). The new approach thus calls for extensive community participation. The challenge is for groups in communities to work in partnership to access the skills, strengths and local knowledge to enable communities to actively participate in youth suicide prevention initiatives (Dickinson et al., 2000:2).
Sets of guidelines call on the community to participate in the development of an ethic of care. 
We as communities are to examine our practices regarding young people; to examine how we include them; to involve them in meaningful and purposeful ways; to enable them to make a contribution; to support them when they take risks; to hear and act on their ‘voice’; to show that we are aware by the way we develop policies; to demonstrate that we are able to reflect on our attitudes; to collectively communicate and to build a safe community for youth. (Dickinson et al., 2000:4)
Identifying at-risk populations is expressly linked with claims that the community is the key to reducing risk. In effect, such claims impute blame on the community at large. This diffuse sense of blame serves as a means to incite community ethics of care. How else can we discharge our culpabilities and duties? It is this diffuse call to community care that fully deploys the regulation of suicide as a network of regulatory relationships that govern at a distance. 
In general, then, the executive regulates suicide with a riskification discourse. This discourse concentrates on the anticipation and prevention of youth suicide. Its core site is not the asylum but rather a wide spread of community-based initiatives. Rather than the treatment of medical pathologies, this risk discourse aims to develop an ethic of self-care. This New Zealand finding closely parallels the conclusions drawn by Pertersen and Lupton’s (1996) study of the new public health initiatives in Britain. According to Petersen and Lupton, ‘within the neo-liberal framework “community participation” is represented as “empowering” (pre-social) subjects through the deployment of rational knowledge and rational techniques of administration’ (1996:173). Armstrong (1983:102) has argued that the discourse of ‘public health is a point of emergence of a new clinical gaze directed at the community rather than the body’. Although New Zealand developments similarly emphasise community participation, they significantly diverge from the British case. Armstrong, Petersen and Lupton all situate these transformations within the realm of public health, a significant point of contact between medical and executive discourses, whereas my account locates the discourse of community participation within the executive proper - the system of bureaucratic administration associated with the political sphere. Although present in medical discourses, in New Zealand the rhetoric of community participation has been rigorously pursued and brought to fruition by a complex web of executively driven practices. This riskification of suicide has been the dominant mode of governance in New Zealand since the late 1970s and is set to continue into the immediate future.
 Transgression of those calculated to be at risk of suicide is regulated through primary prevention that attempts to generate the conditions under which risk attenuates: community participation. As Rose would put it ‘the community is brought into alliance with individualised ethos of choice, personal responsibility, control over one’s fate, self-promotion and self government’ (1999: 249). Civility,  the self-realisation that inheres in choice and the ‘ethico-politics of community’ (Rose 1999: 273), posits freedom in terms of freedom of choice, where the individual is to ‘conduct his or her life, and that of his or her family, as a kind of enterprise, seeking to enhance and capitalize on existence itself through calculated acts and   investments’ (Rose 1999: 164).  Here the regulation of suicide through choosing to participate in the community constitutes government at a distance.  
Suicide in New Zealand 
In the second week of March, 1873, the aged Ann Folks hung herself. On discovery, the body was left to hang for thirty-two hours; dozens came to view the corpse. When the body was finally cut down, the Anglican minister arrived and ‘refused to perform the burial rites over her or allow her to be placed within the area of the burial ground where the other interments had been made’, even though her husband was buried there (Luke, 1982:209).This public defilement and refusal replicated the longstanding European etiquette of  punishing  the suicide,  both the dead body  and in the afterlife (Retterstol, 1993, Minois, 1999).
Seventy two years later, the concern with suicide was concentrated on the living, on attempted suicides. In 1945, Dr Medlicott detailed the new ECT procedure for preparing, amongst others, those asylum patients that had been committed for attempting suicide.
The patient remains in bed on treatment mornings, has no breakfast and should be persuaded to empty his bowels and bladder prior to treatment. The treatment is given on a hard mattress under which is placed a fracture board. A bolster, easily made by rolling blankets, is placed under the mid-thoracic spine and, during convulsion, the patient is held by several nurses; one nurse holds the shoulders firmly down on the bed, another holds the hips down, while another restrains the arms. A gag is placed in the mouth at the commencement of the seizure and the lower jaw supported to prevent dislocation. Respiration should commence immediately after the convulsion.  (Medlicott 1945 in Williams, 1987:164)
Within fifty years of Dr Medlicott’s instructions, the concern with suicide is concentrated on the yet to be in the form of potential suicides.  Now, statistical calculations are used to delineate populations at risk of suicide. In New Zealand, the central risk population is Pakeha youth between the ages of 15-24 (Barwick H., 1992:21), with the bereaved by suicide representing a significant secondary risk population (Picton C. et. al., 2001).
A particularly high risk patient would be a male adolescent who had a depressive disorder and additionally a conduct disorder or substance abuse disorder, and recent stressors such as a break-up with a girlfriend, or arguments with parents; a previous suicide attempt; suicide in a family member or close friend; recent suicide in school or recent representation of actual or fictional suicide on TV or in other media; who has poor social support. (Mental Health Services, 1993:12)
We have, then, a public shaming, a medical treatment and a calculation of risk. Little over a century separates them and each demarcates totally different practices that tell of a concern that shifts from the past to the present to the future.  I suggest, following Foucault (1977:7), that these different modalities introduce specific assemblages of authoritative  calculations and personal aims which, as I have shown,  demonstrate that the history of suicide regulation in New Zealand is a history of governance through freedom.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I have sought to describe concrete, everyday ways in which suicide is and has been constituted as a technology of liberal governance. As ‘liberal  rule  is inextricably bound to the activities  and calculations  of a proliferation  of independent authorities’ so this genealogy of suicide regulation traces the connections between the law, church, medicine and state (Rose 1999:49). The account explicates relays between colonial, social and advanced liberal modes of calculation and criminal, mad and at risk transgressors, to inscribe and enact particular ways of being free New Zealand citizens. This genealogical analysis has set out to dis-quieten the assumption that suicide is a litmus test for liberal freedom. It is better to think of New Zealand’s attempts to regulate suicide as in the service of governing through freedom. 
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Notes
 1 I deliberately use suicide in verb form - to suicide rather than to commit suicide – because I am concerned to highlight that often as not, suicide is not a formal crime in statute.  Suicide has never been a crime under New Zealand law and ceased to be a crime under British law in 1961 ( Garrow  1981). I also use it in verb form as a technique to create a conceptual space to think through suicide regulation  in unfamiliar ways which is a core aim of my paper.  
2 Criminalisation and pathologisation are familiar terms. I made up the term riskification to keep with the format of terms used to convey a sense of process.  Riskification  is used to  denote processes through which  transgressions are  understood   in terms of  risk, in the same way criminalisation is used to denote the   processes that  render  transgressions  as crimes,  and pathologisation renders transgressions  as pathologies. 
3 In New Zealand, the judicial authorities that rendered suicide a criminal offence relied more on executive practices – the linkage between the judiciary’s legal authority and the executive’s political authority was more explicit; their aims and objectives to ensure the rule of law, aligned more, drew upon and meshed with the strategies and techniques available through executive bureaucratic systems than was the case in Britain.  This stemmed from the more particularised and contingent difficulties Britain encountered while attempting to implement legal punishments in a far-flung colony with a small and dispersed population. It is told in a tale of legal loopholes, lack of incarceration facilities and unruly settlers  that lead to explicit central administration as the key to colonial stability (Tennant, 1989, Brunton 1986).
4 Whanau is a Maori term similar to extended family.
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